To Count and be Counted: A Response to Professor Levinson by McCormick, Marcia L.




To Count and be Counted: A Response to
Professor Levinson
Marcia L. McCormick
Saint Louis University School of Law, mmccor20@slu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/faculty
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Law and Gender Commons, Law and
Race Commons, and the Law and Society Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of Scholarship Commons. For more information, please contact erika.cohn@slu.edu, ingah.daviscrawford@slu.edu.
Recommended Citation
McCormick, Marcia L., "To Count and be Counted: A Response to Professor Levinson" (2014). All Faculty Scholarship. 37.
https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/faculty/37
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
999 
TO COUNT AND BE COUNTED: 
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR LEVINSON 
MARCIA L. MCCORMICK* 
INTRODUCTION 
The title of Professor Levinson’s lecture, “Who Counts?” “Sez Who?,”1 
and his exposition of that topic are especially provocative. The question is a 
moving target, asking at one turn, who is counted and for what purpose, then 
moving to whose needs or interests matter, and finally to who does the 
deciding about either the “who” or the “counting.” All of these are questions 
that, as he notes, are dodged on a regular basis by scholars and policy makers 
alike. 
Levinson illustrates how, over time, our concept of identity has shifted 
from innate and immutable to at least partially fluid and constructed—and 
illuminates the problem of indeterminacy of the essentially contested concepts 
that make up all of the questions in this area. This indeterminacy is contrasted 
with the inevitability of needing to draw lines to create a functioning 
community. 
In the end, Professor Levinson focuses on mediating institutions as the 
solution to this latter problem—not necessarily a solution to who ought to 
decide, but rather the practical solution to who does decide. And some of the 
mediating bodies he focuses on are government bodies. They may be 
problematic in the way they shape community, but they are minimally 
problematic because they are accountable; institutions he describes as self-
justifying or at least somewhat democratically legitimate. And in this way, 
without solving the problem of who should be the counters and who the 
counted, the paper leaves us feeling less hopeless than we might otherwise. 
I want to expand on these illustrations in a few ways: to deepen the 
discussion of identity and its effects; to consider less formal, less politically 
 
* Thanks to Joel Goldstein for inviting me to participate in this symposium and to Greg Deschler 
and the other Law Journal staff for organizing the event. Eisha Ahmed, D’Ann Bey, and Robert 
Zimmerman provided excellent research assistance. And special thanks to Sanford Levinson, 
Elizabeth Cohen, Paul Finkelman, Chad Flanders, Jill Hasday, Randall Kennedy, Neil Siegel, and 
Gerald Torres, whose papers and comments helped me immensely. Any omissions or errors are 
mine. 
 1. Sanford Levinson, “Who Counts?” “Sez Who?”, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 937 (2014). 
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legitimate mediating institutions, to consider more fully what people want to 
matter for—in their own eyes and some community’s; and then finally what an 
alternate view of community might be. I think that a deeper framing of this 
question shows how fundamental these matters are, how vital it is that we work 
to answer them, and in the end how inseparable the “who” is from the 
“counting.” 
I.  IDENTITY: FORMATION AND EFFECTS 
Let me start with identity. Identity is complicated, of course, and 
multifaceted. I will use my own as an example. Most would describe my 
identity in terms of race and sex. If I asked other people what my identity was, 
they would say I was a white woman. As I’ll discuss below, this is just a small 
part of my identity, but it is one that is highly visible. 
The initial question that could be asked in response is, what is race and 
what is sex? What makes me at least appear to be white and female? And how 
is that different from saying that I am black and female, black and male, or 
white and male, for example? To answer questions about these identities, we 
have generally resorted to the same sources: genes, biological or phenotypical 
generalities, and finally cultural constructs.2 For race, the scientific community 
has reached a fairly broad consensus that there is as much genetic and 
biological diversity within so-called racial groups and maybe more, as there is 
between them.3 Sex is more strongly linked to genetics and biological and 
phenotypical generalities, but there is much more variation among humans 
than our culture tends to recognize.4 And the boundaries of these identities are 
especially contested when links between biological concepts of identity and 
behavior are explored. There are some works that purport to link race with 
behavioral characteristics,5 but they are not generally accepted as valid in the 
 
 2. ANN MORNING, THE NATURE OF RACE: HOW SCIENTISTS THINK AND TEACH ABOUT 
HUMAN DIFFERENCE 29 (2011). Interestingly, race appears to have arisen as a popular concept 
that was later embraced by scientists. Id. at 25–26; see also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 149–58 (1979). 
 3. See Lynn B. Jorde & Stephen P. Wooding, Genetic Variation, Classification, and 
“Race”, 36 NATURE GENETICS S28, S32 (2004); see also Is Race “Real”?, SOC. SCI. RES. 
COUNCIL, http://raceandgenomics.ssrc.org/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2013) (providing a forum for 
scientists to discuss the state of the science on race). 
 4. See HANNE BLANK, STRAIGHT: THE SURPRISINGLY SHORT HISTORY OF 
HETEROSEXUALITY (2012); JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE 
LIMITS OF SEX (1993); JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER (2004); MACKINNON, supra note 2. 
 5. E.g., RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE 
AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994); J. PHILIPPE RUSHTON, RACE, EVOLUTION, 
AND BEHAVIOR: A LIFE HISTORY PERSPECTIVE (Charles Darwin Res. Inst. 3d ed. 2000) (1995). 
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scientific community.6 Much like the link between biology and sex, and 
perhaps because of it, the link between sex and behavior is considered to be 
stronger; nonetheless, scientists debate whether “sex” encompasses only the 
biological differences that are true for all or nearly all women, or also 
differences in behavior that are believed to be linked to sex.7 
To some extent, asking about identity is a quest for essentialism, which is 
the notion that members of a group share at least one defining quality or 
essence that is internal to the person and fixed.8 And to ask about one aspect of 
identity is to pretend that parts of identity can be separated as discrete from 
other parts, when in reality, identities are intertwined in a way that makes lived 
experiences significantly different among members of what looks like one 
group.9 An alternative approach is that groups are made by categorizing things 
as a matter of social invention alone.10 Social meanings can change through an 
evolutionary process over time, or suddenly as an act of will. Race is at the 
very least largely a social construct,11 and much of what we think of as sex 
turns out also to be socially constructed.12 This is not to say that the thing that 
 
 6. See Leonard Lieberman, How “Caucasoids” Got Such Big Crania and Why They 
Shrank: From Morton to Rushton, 42 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 69, 80 (2001). 
 7. Compare LOUANN BRIZENDINE, THE FEMALE BRAIN 8 (2006) (arguing that the different 
behaviors of women and men are linked to neurological differences), with CORDELIA FINE, 
DELUSIONS OF GENDER: HOW OUR MINDS, SOCIETY, AND NEUROSEXISM CREATE DIFFERENCE, 
at xxiv–xxv (2010) (pointing out the weaknesses in research linking behavior to neurological 
differences and arguing that researchers’ biases make them construct findings to support those 
differences), and REBECCA M. JORDAN-YOUNG, BRAIN STORM: THE FLAWS IN THE SCIENCE OF 
SEX DIFFERENCES, at xii–xiii (2010) (same). We also have a separate term for cultural and 
behavioral aspects of sex performance—gender. We don’t have a similar term for race. 
 8. See MORNING, supra note 2, at 12. 
 9. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, 
Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991). See 
generally RACE-ING JUSTICE EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE 
THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) (describing 
the interplay between race and sex in the controversy surrounding the appointment of Clarence 
Thomas and the allegations that he sexually harassed Anita Hill). 
 10. IAN HACKING, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT? (1999); see also AM. 
SOCIOLOGICAL ASS’N, THE IMPORTANCE OF COLLECTING DATA AND DOING SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC 
RESEARCH ON RACE (2003), available at http://www2.asanet.org/media/asa_race_statement.pdf. 
 11. MORNING, supra note 2, at 32, 36. That is not to say that scientists across disciplines 
have reached consensus that race is purely a social construct with no biological basis. Id. at 36–
38, 47–48. Some disciplines have reached that consensus, however. Id. at 32. 
 12. See MACKINNON, supra note 2, at 152–58. 
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defines the group is not “real”—in fact, there are real social consequences for 
these categorizations.13 
The state of the art tells us that identity is a complicated negotiation 
between society and the individual.14 To some extent, individuals can label 
themselves,15 and to some extent, society or some outsider is the labeler of a 
person’s race or sex.16 Although individuals can self-label, that ability is 
limited by what outsiders will accept, which in turn is limited by what popular 
notions of identity characteristics are. So a person with very dark skin, dark 
eyes, and extremely curly hair may self-identify as white, but outsiders may 
not accept that label, given the phenotypical generalities that we associate with 
blackness and whiteness as racial concepts. 
Moreover, the process of identifying does not involve a process of full 
communication. A perceiver does not withhold judgment about an individual’s 
identity until after asking that individual about his or her identity. In fact, the 
question may not get asked at all unless an individual occupies ambiguous 
territory. Thus, an individual cannot necessarily control how he or she will be 
labeled by others. Even more important, once the external label is affixed to a 
person, and if not easily visible then otherwise known to an observer, the label 
and public attitudes towards that identity shape an individual’s behavior in 
ways we tend to think are unrelated to identity. For example, study after study 
has shown the way that, when a person is a member of a stigmatized group, 
that person performs a task like math or problem solving more poorly when the 
person believes the audience knows their group identity than he or she does if 
 
 13. WILLIAM I. THOMAS & DOROTHY SWAINE THOMAS, THE CHILD IN AMERICA: 
BEHAVIOR PROBLEMS AND PROGRAMS 571–72 (1928), quoted in MORNING, supra note 2, at 14. 
See also generally AM. SOCIOLOGICAL ASS’N, supra note 10 (arguing that even though racial 
categories are socially constructed, their social effect is real and must be studied in order to be 
changed). 
 14. See ANTHONY ELLIOTT, CONCEPTS OF THE SELF (2007); HANDBOOK OF SELF AND 
IDENTITY (Mark Leary & June Price Tangney eds., 2003); IDENTITY: A READER (Paul du Gay et 
al. eds., 2000). 
 15. I do not mean to suggest here that people experience their identity as making a choice. 
Most people describe the significant portions of their identity in terms of who they are, rather 
than what they might choose to do. Most people generally do not feel as if they have chosen a 
race or sex, for example, but consider those innate and immutable characteristics they were born 
with. This framing has been explicitly adopted by our antidiscrimination norm, which generally 
requires assimilation where an identity characteristic can be changed, but protects identity 
characterizations that are immutable. See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON 
OUR CIVIL RIGHTS (2006); see also DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE? 
RETHINKING RACE IN “POST-RACIAL” AMERICA (2013). 
 16. See Sheldon Stryker & Peter J. Burke, The Past, Present, and Future of an Identity 
Theory, 63 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 284, 289–90 (2000) (discussing identity generally). 
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he or she believes the audience does not know that identity.17 One’s racial or 
sex identity in context can profoundly affect one’s sense of belonging in an 
environment like school, work, a neighborhood, or even to a political 
community, which in turn affects their abilities to participate and achieve 
there.18 
Identity is linked to access to social goods, like education and work; to 
physical goods, like housing and wealth; and to measures of well-being, like 
health status and health outcomes. One process of counting shows us that there 
are gaps in achievement, security, pay, and wealth that track identity 
characteristics like sex and race very closely.19 And of course these disparities 
make some people’s lives significantly more difficult and unpleasant. 
 
 17. See, e.g., Karla Hoff & Priyanka Pandey, Discrimination, Social Identity, and Durable 
Inequalities, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 206, 211 (2006). This phenomenon is known as “stereotype 
threat” and was most thoroughly first documented by Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, 
Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797 (1995). Since that time, many more studies have been 
published on the phenomenon. See Hannah-Hanh D. Nguyen & Ann Marie Ryan, Does 
Stereotype Threat Affect Test Performance of Minorities and Women? A Meta-Analysis of 
Experimental Evidence, 93 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1314 (2008). 
 18. See Gregory M. Walton & Geoffrey L. Cohen, A Question of Belonging: Race, Social 
Fit, and Achievement, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 82, 94 (2007). 
 19. See MARIKO LIN CHANG, SHORTCHANGED: WHY WOMEN HAVE LESS WEALTH AND 
WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 20, 35–36 (2010) (documenting the wealth gap, that women own 
about thirty-six cents for every dollar of wealth owned by men, and exploring the causes); JODY 
FEDER & LINDA LEVINE, CONG. RES. SERV., PAY EQUITY LEGISLATION 1 (2010), available at 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1768&context=key_workplace 
(according to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2008 full-time working women had a median annual 
salary of $35,745, while men had a median salary of $46,367); PAUL TAYLOR ET AL., PEW RES. 
CTR., TWENTY-TO-ONE: WEALTH GAPS RISE TO RECORD HIGHS BETWEEN WHITES, BLACKS 
AND HISPANICS 13–14 (2011), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/07/SDT-
Wealth-Report_7-26-11_FINAL.pdf (according to the Pew Research Center, in 2009 the median 
net worth of white households was $113,149, while the median net worth of Asian, Hispanic, and 
black households was $78,066, $6,325 and $5,677 respectively); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The 
Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2 & n.5, 5–6 
(2006) (explaining that inequalities among races, such as wealth and educational opportunities, 
still exist today despite Americans’ increasingly egalitarian attitudes toward race); R. Richard 
Banks et al., Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 
1169, 1171, 1184 (2006) (citing the U.S. Census Bureau’s statistics that the average white family 
earns 1.5 times as much income and has several times as much wealth, as the average black 
family); Nancy M. Carter & Christine Silva, Women in Management: Delusions of Progress, 
HARV. BUS. REV., March 2010, at 19 (summarizing a study of women in management and 
finding that among graduates of elite MBA programs, “women continue to lag men at every 
single career stage, right from their first professional jobs”); Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Toward a New 
Civil Rights Framework, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 353, 353 (2007) (“African Americans, 
Latinos, and Native Americans lag behind Whites and sometimes Asian Americans on almost all 
relevant socio-economic indicators.”); Rachel F. Moran, Whatever Happened to Racism?, 79 ST. 
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So labeling someone—counting them as a member of a group—is an 
exercise of power that has real effects on that person’s own behavior and on 
the social goods that person has access to. Including them in a favored group 
boosts achievement and access to social goods. Excluding them, or including 
them in a disfavored group, hurts individual achievement and limits access to 
such social goods. 
Let me expand on the process of how the counting happens, how that 
power is exercised, and also explain in greater detail some of the effects on a 
person of being counted. Once again, I’ll draw on science. Our perception of 
the world is framed in fundamental ways by our beliefs and our experiences, 
and that framing reinforces our beliefs in a recursive fashion.20 According to 
cognitive psychology research, this is how the natural process of cognition 
works. We encounter things in infinite variations. If we had to fully process the 
impact of each variation we encountered, we would be paralyzed into 
inaction.21 Accordingly, in order to act in the world, we generalize about 
people and objects after a few encounters, use those generalizations to define 
categories, and subsequently use those categories to quickly sort what and 
whom we encounter without reflection.22 Our categories define for us what we 
have encountered and help us predict how that thing will act or be acted 
upon.23 This sorting function makes the world seem more predictable and 
allows us to make judgments quickly, both of which allow us to act where 
otherwise we would be paralyzed. 
Although this process is important to a person’s ability to function, relying 
on categories or creating group identities has far-reaching consequences both 
for the person doing the counting and for the person being counted. When we 
have assigned an object or person to a group, we lose our ability to view that 
object or person independently; we perceive the object or person as more like 
 
JOHN’S L. REV. 899, 900 (2005) (despite declining racism and increasing interracial contact, 
significant gaps in educational attainment, earnings, and wealth still exist between white and non-
white Americans). 
 20. See generally Susan T. Fiske, Social Cognition and Social Perception, 44 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL. 155, 156 (1993) (summarizing research in a number of areas of cognitive psychology, 
all of which observed some aspect of this recursive process). 
 21. See Eleanor Rosch, Human Categorization, in 1 STUDIES IN CROSS-CULTURAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 1, 1–2 (Neil Warren ed., 1977) (“Since no organism can cope with infinite 
diversity, one of the most basic functions of all organisms is the cutting up of the environment 
into classifications by which non-identical stimuli can be treated as equivalent.”). 
 22. Eleanor Rosch, Principles of Categorization, in COGNITION AND CATEGORIZATION 27, 
28 (Eleanor Rosch & Barbara B. Lloyd eds., 1978). 
 23. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1188–89 (1995). 
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the others within that group and less like those outside of that group.24 The 
same effects happen when the process is used for people. Even when the group 
identity is arbitrary, where, for example, people are randomly assigned to 
teams, people view members of their own group (the in-group) as more like 
themselves, and others (the out-group) as more different from them than if the 
others had no group identity.25 We are not just counters of others, we also 
identify ourselves to groups, and that process has similarly important 
consequences. People who identify as part of a group have great difficulty 
perceiving differences among members of the out-group even when they are 
given information about the individuals in the out-group identical to what they 
are given about individuals in their own in-group.26 In other words, identifying 
as a member of a group interferes with a person’s ability to interpret 
information about members of both the in-group and the out-group. 
One consequence of these cognitive structures is that, when we count 
people as members of a group, we tend to stereotype, or create a cognitive 
 
 24. See Donald T. Campbell, Enhancement of Contrast as Composite Habit, 53 J. 
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 350, 355 (1956) (finding that when nonsense syllables were linked 
to a spot on a spatial continuum, participants tended to judge them as more different from each 
other than if no syllables were linked to any spot); Krieger, supra note 23, at 1186 (describing 
two studies and citing Henri Tajfel & A.L. Wilkes, Classification and Quantitative Judgment, 54 
BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 101, 104 (1963) (when lines were grouped, participants judged the 
comparative length of those lines as more similar when they compared lines within the same 
group and more different from each other when they compared a line to one in the other group 
than the same people did when they compared the length of lines not assigned to any group)); 
Henri Tajfel, Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice, 25 J. SOC. ISSUES 79, 83–86 (1969) (describing the 
above experiment in more detail). 
 25. Marilynn B. Brewer, In-Group Favoritism: The Subtle Side of Intergroup 
Discrimination, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 160, 
161–62 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996); Ann Locksley et al., Social 
Categorization and Discriminatory Behavior: Extinguishing the Minimal Intergroup 
Discrimination Effect, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 773, 776–83 (1980); David A. 
Wilder, Perceiving Persons as a Group: Categorization and Intergroup Relations, in COGNITIVE 
PROCESSES IN STEREOTYPING AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR 213, 217 (David L. Hamilton ed., 
1981). 
 26. David L. Hamilton & Tina K. Trolier, Stereotypes and Stereotyping: An Overview of the 
Cognitive Approach, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 127, 131 (John F. Dovidio & 
Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986). Numerous studies that support this assertion are summarized in 
Patricia W. Linville & Gregory W. Fischer, Stereotyping and Perceived Distributions of Social 
Characteristics: An Application to Ingroup–Outgroup Perception, in PREJUDICE, 
DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM, supra at 165, 168–73. Some of these studies involved asking 
members of student groups to rate the similarity of members of their own and other groups and to 
assess the traits of members of their own and different groups; asking people to assess how likely 
someone in their group would fit a stereotype and how likely someone outside of their group 
would; and asking people with a particular opinion to rate the similarity of people with the same 
or a different opinion. Id. 
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shortcut that links personal traits with salient characteristics in order to 
simplify the task of perceiving, processing, and retaining information about 
people.27 Once set, these cognitive shortcuts influence our judgment 
continuously to “bias[ ] in predictable ways the perception, interpretation, 
encoding, retention, and recall of information about other people.”28 In other 
words, they create expectations that transform the way we perceive others, 
remember things about others, and interpret motivations for the actions of 
others.29 We tend to remember the things a person actually did only if those 
actions fit our stereotypes of that person; we tend to believe that we remember 
a person doing things consistent with the stereotypes even if the person never 
did them; and we tend to forget the things that a person did that did not 
conform to those stereotypes.30 We interpret actions based on stereotypes by 
tending to assume that a person who acts consistently with a stereotype acted 
because of innate characteristics (i.e., that they will usually act this way 
because they are this type of person), but a person who acts inconsistently with 
a stereotype acted because of transitional or situational factors (i.e., that they 
do not usually act this way because they are not this type of person).31 
In practical terms, this means that labels for race and sex will carry with 
them assumptions about what a person is like and how he or she will behave in 
any given situation. Upon deciding that I am a white woman, an outside 
observer might also assume things about my intelligence, competence, 
strength, vulnerability, trustworthiness, dangerousness, sexual availability, 
sexual orientation, and more. Whatever is lumped into the category of white 
 
 27. Krieger, supra note 23, at 1187–88; Barbara F. Reskin, The Proximate Causes of 
Employment Discrimination, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 319, 321–22 (2000). While this description of 
stereotypes may sound very benign, in a society with power imbalances such as ours, stereotypes 
may perpetuate and even aggravate those power imbalances. 
 28. Krieger, supra note 23, at 1188. Just as for salience, which defines groupness in the first 
place, we decide what behaviors to attribute to particular groups either consciously or through 
exposure to culture. David L. Hamilton, A Cognitive-Attributional Analysis of Stereotyping, in 12 
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 53, 64 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1979). 
 29. See Krieger, supra note 23, at 1201–03 (explaining that cognitive shortcuts cause us to 
encode behaviors as traits that affect subsequent judgments and create a preexisting stereotype). 
 30. Id. at 1207–09 (summarizing research on stereotypes and memory); see also Nancy 
Cantor & Walter Mischel, Traits as Prototypes: Effects on Recognition Memory, 35 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 38, 41–45 (1977). 
 31. Krieger, supra note 23, at 1204–07. A good example of this kind of attribution bias is 
given by Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science to 
Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases and Defang the “Cluelessness” Defense, 7 EMP. RTS. & 
EMP. POL’Y J. 401, 433–34 (2003). Because women with children are presumed to innately 
prioritize their children over their jobs, when a woman with children is late to work, her boss is 
likely to assume that her innate characteristic of prioritizing childcare responsibilities was the 
cause. Because men are presumed to put work first, a man late for work may be assumed to have 
been caught in traffic, a transitional cause. 
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woman would be attributed to me. Counting a person as a member of a group, 
thus, can silence that person or hide ways that person differs from stereotypes 
or generalizations about the group. Inclusion itself can disempower. 
Although the process of sorting happens largely below the level of full 
consciousness, this process is not uncontrollable. First of all, individuals define 
what characteristics will be salient to define a group in any given context. 
Defining salience may be something most of us have not given much thought 
to, instead absorbing information about what characteristics matter to others, 
and consequently should to us, from exposure to the culture we live in.32 At the 
same time, however, judgments of salience and the resulting cognitive 
processes do not function entirely automatically and can be changed by 
conscious effort.33 
II.  WE ARE THE MEDIATING INSTITUTIONS 
As the description of cognitive structures in the prior section shows, we are 
each counters, each exercising some power over others by adopting particular 
categories and by sorting people into them. Because we may perceive 
ourselves as somewhat passive in that process, simply absorbing cultural 
categories, and then allowing them to operate at a level below fully self-aware 
consciousness, we may not feel like we are exercising power. Yet we are—
which brings me to my second subject—less legitimate mediating institutions 
than those Professor Levinson identifies. It turns out that we are each counters 
and counted, exercising some level of power and subject to the exercise of 
power by others. And clearly being counted matters—it shapes our behavior, it 
shapes others’ behavior towards us, and it has far-reaching, real-world effects. 
As Professor Levinson’s essay frames the issues, we might usually think 
about counting in terms of minority groups’ efforts to be considered true 
members of the political community. Those politics of belonging, however, are 
only one aspect of why this question is important for minority groups. The 
 
 32. See HOWARD J. EHRLICH, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 35 (1973) 
(“Stereotypes about ethnic groups appear as a part of the social heritage of society. They are 
transmitted across generations as a component of the accumulated knowledge of society.”); 
Richard Nisbett et al, Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition, 108 
PSYCHOL. REV. 291, 291–92 (2001) (describing their review of the literature on how societies 
differ in systems of thought and drawing conclusions about how those differences influence 
cognitive processes). 
 33. Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 242, 244–47, 255–56 (2002); Ann C. McGinley, ¡Viva La 
Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415, 
430–32 (2000); see also JACK MEZIROW, TRANSFORMATIVE DIMENSIONS OF ADULT LEARNING 
(1991); Jack Mezirow, Transformation Theory of Adult Learning, in IN DEFENSE OF THE 
LIFEWORLD: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ADULT LEARNING 39 (Michael R. Welton ed., 1995). 
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converse of belonging matters as much, and maybe sometimes more, for the 
group. The formal entitlement to exercise this power of counting is an 
important attribute of sovereignty and community. Professor Torres’ remarks 
about Indian Tribes demonstrated this point well.34 When the federal 
government denies Tribes the right to include, or more recently exclude, 
individuals from membership, they are not being treated as sovereign nations.35 
Professor Kennedy’s remarks spoke a similar refrain.36 Although the black 
community is not separately sovereign within the United States, or even 
necessarily perfectly defined or cohesive, various groups have exercised power 
and sought to exercise power on its behalf in the face of oppression by both 
governments and less formal groups of white individuals.37 Just as the right to 
exclude is an important attribute of sovereignty,38 and perhaps the most 
important of property rights,39 the right to exclude someone from the black 
community is likewise an important recognition of power in—or concession of 
power to—that group. 
Indian Tribes and black people are not the only ones who have had a 
troubled history related to belonging to the political community of the United 
States. As Professor Levinson notes, women of all colors have been excluded 
from the political community by not being given the right themselves to vote 
until the early twentieth century.40 That exclusion was important, but it does 
not consider the whole story. To consider sex and belonging more fully, I 
would like to employ a feminist strategy to think more about the ways that we 
organize ourselves for everyday life and consider belonging in a broader 
context. 
Professor Levinson has focused on how we organize ourselves into a 
political community of government and governed. Political belonging is, of 
course, fundamental, but not necessarily what most people think of when they 
think about being counted. Perhaps this is privilege talking, the privilege of 
 
 34. Gerald Torres, American Blood: Who Is Counting and For What?, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
1017, 1018, 1021–22, 1036 (2014). 
 35. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 603–
04 (1889) (discussing the power to exclude as a characteristic of sovereignty). 
 36. Randall Kennedy, Response to Sanford Levinson: Who Counts?—The Politics of Racial 
Membership and Excommunication, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 989, 989, 997 (2014). 
 37. An example of the exercise of this power would be efforts by the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and its Legal Defense and Educational Fund. 
See NAACP: 100 Years of History, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/pages/naacp-history (last 
viewed Dec. 12, 2013) (providing a brief description of the efforts of the NAACP). 
 38. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 603–04. 
 39. See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 734–
35, 740 (1998) (arguing that the right to exclude is the very definition of property). 
 40. Levinson, supra note 1, at 942, 976. 
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someone who has always lived in what I will loosely term a “functional, stable, 
government and political system,” but most people do not seem to see 
themselves as political actors. For example, people do not vote, particularly in 
local and state elections, where they likely have the most power and where 
government has the most impact on them.41 By and large, they do not research 
issues or candidates, or participate in other aspects of political life.42 This lack 
of political identity may be partly responsible for both the rise of the Tea Party 
and Occupy Movement, and the backlash against the Affordable Care Act and 
the National Security Agency’s surveillance. If people do not think of their 
government, do not think they are affected by government, or at least not 
positively, then they might react strongly when they notice that government is 
actually affecting them. 
In any event, other mediating institutions, mediating institutions that are 
not accountable in any political sense to a community, feel like much more 
powerful gatekeepers to the social goods that are necessary to allow us to be 
fully functioning members of the community: educational institutions, the 
entities that employ us for wages, the social institutions that allow us to 
connect and build relationships, and the legal actors who perpetuate the system 
of laws that define borders, distribute benefits and burdens, preserve or 
penalize relationships, and reward or punish conduct. I am sure I am leaving 
things out here.43 But my intent is to highlight how access to power other than 
 
 41. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 31–35 (2000) (describing a reduction in voting for the President 
primarily, but also mentioning similar declines in local elections); Zoltan L. Hajnal & Paul G. 
Lewis, Municipal Institutions and Voter Turnout in Local Elections, 38 URB. AFF. REV. 645, 
645–46 (2003) (summarizing research suggesting that turnout for state and local elections is only 
half what it is for federal elections). 
 42. See PUTNAM, supra note 41, at 37–47 (describing a decline in political engagement more 
broadly). 
 43. One powerful set of institutions that I am purposely leaving out is the mainstream 
women’s movements. The most successful women’s movements have represented the interests of 
wealthier white women and focused on issues most relevant to them. For example, prominent 
woman suffragists explicitly used whiteness as a rallying cry in an effort to gain support for 
women’s suffrage from white men. See, e.g., NELL IRVIN PAINTER, SOJOURNER TRUTH: A LIFE, 
A SYMBOL 230–32 (1996). Most recently, tension between issues most popularized as feminist 
issues by the media and critique by women of color has shown the pervasive effects of power 
differences among women and within groups. See, e.g., Michelle Goldberg, Feminism’s Toxic 
Twitter Wars, THE NATION, Feb. 17, 2014, at 12, available at http://www.thenation.com/article/ 
178140/feminisms-toxic-twitter-wars; Jessica Grose, Is “Toxic” Online Culture Paralyzing 
Feminism?, SLATE (Jan. 31, 2014, 1:28 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2014/01/31/ 
_toxic_twitter_wars_is_online_culture_paralyzing_feminism.html; Suey Park & David J. 
Leonard, In Defense of Twitter Feminism, MODEL VIEW CULTURE (Feb. 3, 2014), http://model 
viewculture.com/pieces/in-defense-of-twitter-feminism; see also Arit John & Allie Jones, The 
Incomplete Guide to Feminist Infighting, THE WIRE (Jan. 29, 2014, 6:22 PM), http://www.the 
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political power is mediated by institutions that have no legitimacy in a political 
theory sense, and which are not necessarily even formal institutions, but rather 
the sum of many individual choices. 
The law of the United States and most western countries has embodied a 
distinction between what is public and properly the focus of government 
attention, and what is private not properly the focus of government attention 
but left to individual arrangement, usually heavily shaped by tradition.44 This 
distinction is somewhat of a false one, however, because the power of the state 
has been arrayed behind the actor who wielded power in that so-called private 
relationship.45 Consider the family. Before the twentieth century, the power of 
the state aligned behind the male head of household, allowing him sole right to 
control property of his own and his wife, allowing him sole right to contract, 
and allowing him sole decision-making authority over children.46 Professor 
Hasday’s contribution describes how this public/private distinction—carried 
out through the law of coverture—lives on in family law even after the Married 
Women’s Property Acts abolished coverture.47 
This public/private distinction is a foundational principle of our 
government still, but it obscures the way that government and our system of 
laws support one private party at the expense of another. For example, property 
owners are supported by a web of laws that protect their use of property to 
create or amass more property.48 Corporations and other employers are 
 
wire.com/politics/2014/01/incomplete-guide-feminist-infighting/357509/. These issues are 
important and complex, and they deserve more than being an item on a list of mediating 
institutions. Dealing with them thoroughly is beyond the scope of this Essay, and so I chose not to 
bring them up in the text. 
 44. See BARBARA ARNEIL, POLITICS & FEMINISM 28–42 (1999) (describing the roots of the 
public/private distinction in Plato’s works); id. at 43–76 (critiquing that distinction). 
 45. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 244–45 
(1989). 
 46. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 234–307 (1985) (describing the legal structures favoring 
fathers and the incursions into those rules); Claudia Zaher, When a Woman’s Marital Status 
Determined Her Legal Status: A Research Guide on the Common Law Doctrine of Coverture, 94 
LAW LIBR. J. 459 (2002) (summarizing the law of coverture and providing a bibliography of other 
sources on the subject). 
 47. See also JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED (forthcoming June 2014). 
 48. A foundational example of such a law can be found in the Fifth Amendment, which 
prohibits the taking of property without due process of law or just compensation. U.S. CONST. 
amend. V. The protection of property rights is so deeply embedded in legal theory that it is 
sometimes difficult to see. One example might be the influence of Law and Economics; its focus 
on efficiency privileges property concepts over concepts that are not thought easily quantifiable. 
See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Influence of Economics on Law: A 
Quantitative Study 36 J.L. & ECON. 385, 385–88, 391 (1993) (measuring the influence of 
economics on law only through 1990). 
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protected in this way from claims by employees, under the rationale that 
government should not interfere with managerial prerogatives related to 
capital.49 Those with property or who earn incomes have gained part of the 
value of their property or income as a result of public investment that has 
added value or helped to create it.50 Similarly, those who abuse their intimate 
partners or children are protected by a system of laws and legal actors that 
minimize harm when it occurs within a relationship, and which protect access 
and control those abusers have to those partners or children.51 
Corporations, businesses, and property owners have formal kinds of 
power, enforced by a system of laws, even if the power they exercise is not as 
 
 49. See JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 136–42 
(1983) (emphasizing the deference that courts have given managerial prerogatives in the context 
of employer responses to protected employee activity). The employment-at-will doctrine also 
embodies this value. See Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The 
Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 65, 68 (2000) (explaining that the at-
will doctrine relies on a principle of limited government intervention). 
 50. This point was made by President Obama in a campaign speech in Roanoke, Virginia on 
July 13, 2012: 
  If you were successful, somebody along the line gave you some help. There was a 
great teacher somewhere in your life. Somebody helped to create this unbelievable 
American system that we have that allowed you to thrive. Somebody invested in roads 
and bridges. If you’ve got a business—you didn’t build that. Somebody else made that 
happen. The Internet didn’t get invented on its own. Government research created the 
Internet so that all the companies could make money off the Internet. 
  The point is, is [sic] that when we succeed, we succeed because of our individual 
initiative, but also because we do things together. There are some things, just like fighting 
fires, we don’t do on our own. 
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at a Campaign Event in Roanoke, Virginia 
(July 13, 2012), available at OFF. PRESS SEC’Y, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2012/07/13/remarks-president-campaign-event-roanoke-virginia. Investments in 
infrastructure, security, and economic stability are necessary conditions for individual businesses 
to succeed. 
 51. There are many examples of these legal and practical structures. See, e.g., Katie M. 
Edwards et al., Rape Myths: History, Individual and Institutional-Level Presence, and 
Implications for Change, 65 SEX ROLES 761 (2011); Jessica Klarfeld, A Striking Disconnect: 
Marital Rape Law’s Failure to Keep Up with Domestic Violence Law, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1819 (2011) (describing the history of the marital rape exemption and remaining statutory 
limitations on sexual violence committed by a spouse); Emily J. Sack, Is Domestic Violence a 
Crime?: Intimate Partner Rape as Allegory, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 535 (2010) 
(arguing that despite widespread legal policies criminalizing domestic violence, the law has not 
been implemented); Nancy Ver Steegh, Differentiating Types of Domestic Violence: Implications 
for Child Custody, 65 LA. L. REV. 1379 (2005) (discussing domestic violence and surveying 
custody practices); Jennifer Wriggins, Interspousal Tort Immunity and Insurance “Family 
Member Exclusions”: Shared Assumptions, Relational and Liberal Feminist Challenges, 17 WIS. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 251 (2002) (arguing that insurance policies created de facto interspousal 
immunities). 
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democratically legitimate as the power exercised by elected officials. However, 
the operation of this power is sometimes diffuse. A corporation acts through its 
officers and employees; property owners are part of a community of other 
owners. When taken in the aggregate, though, decisions by all of these people 
have large effects on access to social goods like jobs, education, and housing. 
When these private parties count others as belonging or not belonging—at 
work, in this neighborhood, at this school—we can see widespread patterns of 
exclusion for members of disfavored groups.52 
Because of these effects, many so-called private institutions ought to be the 
focus of our concern in looking at mediating institutions that determine who 
counts. Just to give an example of some concerns women might have were we 
to decide what institutions should be publicly accountable, consider a recent 
collection of essays on feminist constitutionalism.53 The chapters focus on the 
gendered division of household labor,54 marriage,55 abortion and the right to 
bear children,56 pregnancy,57 domestic violence,58 and multicultural women 
and aspects of multiple identities,59 among others. Some of these issues are 
 
 52. Examples of these effects could be the widespread residential racial segregation, see 
Kyle Vanhemert, The Best Map Ever Made of America’s Racial Segregation, WIRED (Aug. 26, 
2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/design/2013/08/how-segregated-is-your-city-this-eye-
opening-map-shows-you/; educational racial segregation, RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, ECON. POL’Y 
INST., FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS, SEGREGATION THEN, SEGREGATION SINCE: EDUCATION AND THE 
UNFINISHED MARCH 2 (Aug. 27, 2013); and gender segregation in the workforce, Ariane 
Hegewisch et al., Inst. for Women’s Pol’y Res., Separate and Not Equal? Gender Segregation in 
the Labor Market and the Gender Wage Gap (IWPR Briefing Paper C377, Sept. 2010). 
 53. See FEMINIST CONSTITUTIONALISM: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES (Beverley Baines et al. 
eds., 2012) [hereinafter FEMINIST CONSTITUTIONALISM]. 
 54. Jennifer Nedelsky, The Gendered Division of Household Labor: An Issue of 
Constitutional Rights, in FEMINIST CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 53, at 15. 
 55. Beverley Baines, Polygamy and Feminist Constitutionalism, in FEMINIST 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 53, at 452; Mary Anne Case, Feminist Fundamentalism and the 
Constitutionalization of Marriage, in FEMINIST CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 53, at 48; 
Pascale Fournier, On God, Promises, and Money: Islamic Divorce at the Crossroads of Gender 
and the Law, in FEMINIST CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 53, at 433. 
 56. Rosalind Dixon & Martha C. Nussbaum, Abortion, Dignity, and a Capabilities 
Approach, in FEMINIST CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 53, at 64; Nicole Huberfeld, Federal 
Spending and Compulsory Maternity, in FEMINIST CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 53, at 281; 
Rachel Rebouché, Challenges for Contemporary Reproductive Rights Advocacy: The South 
African Example, in FEMINIST CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 53, at 298. 
 57. Jennifer S. Hendricks, Pregnancy, Equality, and U.S. Constitutional Law, in FEMINIST 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 53, at 263. 
 58. Puja Kapai, Minority Women: A Struggle for Equal Protection against Domestic 
Violence, in FEMINIST CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 53, at 336. 
 59. Hilal Elver, Secular Constitutionalism and Muslim Women’s Rights: The Turkish 
Headscarf Controversy and Its Impact on the European Court of Human Rights, in FEMINIST 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 53, at 413; Kerri A. Froc, Will “Watertight Compartments” 
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part of constitutional cases in the United States currently, but are conceived of 
only as negative rights women (and more often couples) might have from 
government intervention, rather than a positive right to exercise agency or be 
supported in these areas despite opposition or indifference by other private 
actors.60 Other areas of concern might be access to quality education, jobs with 
sufficient pay to support a family, public health, the environment, security 
from the police or armed civilians, and food safety. If women count, then 
concerns for their needs and injuries count.61 
Being counted in one domain can have effects in another. Consider 
Cynthia Estlund’s book Working Together.62 In it, she makes a powerful case 
about the importance of the workplace to democratic participation. The 
workplace is the single place that workers are likely to encounter people of 
different cultures, religions, races, and ethnicities.63 Workers are able to work 
together across these lines, fostering connectedness and cooperation.64 These 
interpersonal ties and practice at cooperation can set the foundation for 
democratic participation and effective governance.65 Accordingly, Estlund’s 
focus is on making the workplace a more cooperative and democratic place.66 
Counting women as workers, therefore, has effects on their counting in 
political life. In short, when private parties decide who counts and for what, 
they police the boundaries not only of groups, but of the material and social 
benefits those groups may enjoy. 
III.  WHAT PEOPLE WANT TO MATTER FOR 
To this point, this Essay has mostly focused on what it means to count and 
how counting is accomplished by each of us. That focus on how we are 
 
Sink Women’s Charter Rights? The Need for a New Theoretical Approach to Women’s Multiple 
Rights Claims under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in FEMINIST 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 53, at 132; Vrinda Narain, Critical Multiculturalism, in 
FEMINIST CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 53, at 377; Susan Williams, Democratic Theory, 
Feminist Theory, and Constitutionalism: The Challenge of Multiculturalism, in FEMINIST 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 53, at 393. 
 60. This concept was described first by ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR 
ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 164–65 (1969); cf. Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the Reality of 
American Constitutional Exceptionalism, 107 MICH. L. REV. 391 (2008) (describing ways that 
somewhat positive rights are built into the system so that the U.S. is less exceptional than it might 
initially appear). 
 61. See generally MACKINNON, supra note 45, at 244. 
 62. CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A 
DIVERSE DEMOCRACY (2003). 
 63. Id. at 7–12. 
 64. See id. at 60–101. 
 65. See id. at 103–39. 
 66. See id. at 141–76. 
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counters yet not accountable brings me to my third point, which is what people 
want to matter for. This relates back to a great extent to the question of identity 
that I started with. I began by asserting that an outsider might identify me by 
my race and sex. I might also define my identity in terms of race and sex, 
although I have more information, so my definition might not perfectly match 
what an outsider would label me as. And after hearing me speak and knowing 
my last name, an outsider would probably add additional labels to my identity, 
like Irish-American in the middle to upper socioeconomic class. But I might 
just as likely define my identity in terms of what I do, what I like, what I am 
connected to—whether I have to earn a living, how I do so, what I own or 
exercise control over, who exercises control over me, what relationships both 
by kinship and by choice are important to me and what are not, who and what I 
support materially and emotionally, the education I have received, the 
geography of my upbringing, and as Professor Levinson discusses by focusing 
on religion, my view of life, the universe, and everything. 
These aspects of identity are at least as fundamental and have at least as 
far-ranging practical effects as my race and my sex. They are also intertwined. 
Whether I have to earn a living and what I do is directly related to what I might 
own or exercise control over, and both are related to whether others privilege 
the relationships I find important or whether I feel that I am developing or 
supporting those relationships appropriately. Moreover, each is intertwined 
with the construction of my race and my sex. Because I am a white woman, 
people generally may not expect that I need to work to support a family, and 
that may impact their view of me as a worker. Conversely, because I am a 
white, middle-class woman, I had access to quality education, which helped 
me have a career that allows me to support a family. 
This is not to detract from Professor Levinson’s focus. We need and want 
to count for civil rights like voting, but that is not enough. We must count for 
other needs too, like the ability to share in rights of property, to contract, to 
have access to education and to jobs (formal and in practice) and professions, 
to be safe in our environments, and to be able to develop relationships and 
have those protected. These are all rights of belonging. 
And we also need to count for each other. We need to be allowed and 
expected to support each other in formal ways like jury service, military 
service, and civil service, or in functional ways like sharing resources with 
those who need them, and risks with those who have them through things like 
food stamps, social security, Medicare, Medicaid, and other insurance 
programs. These are all duties of belonging that give us the rights to share in 
the benefits. This sharing in duties and benefits is what a community does. 
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IV.  WHAT IS/OUGHT TO BE THE NATURE OF COMMUNITY 
This brings me to my last point about community. We tend to define 
community in atomistic terms as an aggregation of individuals with 
independent thoughts, motives, and actions. Professor Levinson’s essay seems 
to posit a world like this, a world of individuals seeking power or entry into a 
community and individuals exercising power to include or exclude. My 
description of the way we are counters of others and, consequently, our 
collective role as operating as mediating institutions, could be seen as 
describing community the same way. But I want to insert a caution here. That 
description of community seems problematic as a starting point both 
philosophically and empirically. 
It is true that we are each trapped in our own heads, so to speak, and there 
is much we cannot share except imperfectly. In that sense, it is true that we are 
independent and isolated. Additionally, most of us have some capability of 
action that does not depend on the will or even cooperation of anyone else. But 
we are also fundamentally interdependent. We are relational creatures—social, 
seeking relationships for a variety of reasons, and we generally cooperate with 
each other to reach all kinds of goals. Even the most powerful depend on a 
system created with others to protect, perpetuate, or exercise that power. So 
viewing communities as nothing more than an agglomeration of independent 
actors acting only on self-interest seems incomplete as an empirical matter. 
And as a philosophical matter, this view of community locks us into 
certain assumptions and hides certain truths from us—truths about the 
inevitability of the hierarchy we have and where power is being exercised. For 
example, we see current distributions as natural, the product of individual 
effort, not created or facilitated by state power, and yet, in reality, they could 
not exist this way without that backing. 
Thus, part of the challenge in deciding who counts is to delineate what the 
end product of that counting is. But perhaps if we defined community by 
shared commitments, untethered to geography or identity, we could get a more 
accurate picture of what community is, and we could create some 
accountability in our currently unaccountable mediating institutions. Defining 
a community by shared commitments might also allow people to count 
themselves in or even partway in instead of counting others in or out and 
counting them in or out completely. A community formed that way would not 
necessarily have the power of excluding some, though, and so it may not have 
power many see as important to sovereignty. And it is difficult to see how such 
a community could replace our current political communities, anchored to 
physical space and resources. 
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CONCLUSION 
To conclude, let me return to the fundamental question of who counts. This 
is an important question about power, inclusion, and exclusion. The answer is 
likewise important—we do. We are capable of being counted as members of a 
number of groups, and we are capable of counting others as members of those 
groups. Our counting has consequences. It can empower those counted in or 
silence them by counting them in; it can disempower those counted out, or 
preserve some small power for those counted in. When we realize that we are 
both counted and counters, we can begin to see the ways in which it is true, 
and that realization may open up the opportunities we have to count 
differently. 
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